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Introduction 
Much policy literature on digitalization and development has focused on 
the importance of connecting developing countries to digital networks, 
and how such technology can expand access to information for billions 
of people in developing countries, stimulating economic activity, collab-
oration and organizations. Good connection to digital networks may 
have a fundamental impact on societies, changing not only how individ-
uals and businesses navigate, operate and seek opportunities, but also 
as regards relations between government and the citizenry. Instead of 
adding to the substantial literature on the potential dividends, this re-
port examines a less-studied issue: the new societal vulnerabilities 
emerging from digitalization in developing countries. While there is 
wide agreement about the need to bridge the gap between the connected 
and the disconnected, the pitfalls are many, especially concerning cyber 
security1 – a topic often neglected, also in the recent World Bank report 
Digital Dividends (2016).  
The present report is an attempt at redressing this imbalance. Firstly, 
I contextualize security concerns by briefly describing the historical tra-
jectory of digitalization in developing countries and how it diverges from 
that of the developed countries. Selected empirical snapshots are pre-
sented to describe the current situation in several developing countries. 
This contextualization exercise provides the backdrop for the second 
section, which explores how ‘technological leapfrogging’ in developing 
countries creates new societal vulnerabilities different from those in the 
industrialized world, and argues that cyber security needs to become an 
integral part of development if the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) are to be achieved. In the third section I contextualize the ‘own-
ership’ debate from the development sector to the cyber field. Measures 
for building cyber security capacity must exceed prescribed standards, 
values and subscription numbers, in order to capture the social and eco-
nomic context in which digitalization occurs. Finally, I turn to how the 
public–private relationship in the field of digitalization puts ‘ownership’ 
in a new light.  
                                                          
1  Cyber security is closely interlinked with the security of cyberspace; it is broadly un-
derstood and involves a multitude of actors in this text. The link between cyber se-
curity and national security is well established and uncontested. Myriam Dunn 
Cavelty’s broad definition is used here: it refers to cyber security in the technical 
sphere as: ‘… a multifaceted set of technologies, processes and practices designed 
to protect networks, computers, programs and data from attack, damage or unau-
thorized access, in accordance with the common information security goals: the pro-
tection of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.’ In the national 
setting it refers to ‘the security one enjoys in and from cyberspace’ (Cavelty, forth-
coming 2016: 2–3) 
Rationale 
 Digital technology underpins most of the social, economic and political 
development goals of most donor countries and international organiza-
tions today. Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB), an approach aimed 
at advancing, cultivating and encouraging growth and stability in devel-
oping countries through digitalization, seems set to play an increasingly 
important role in future foreign-policy considerations and government 
programmes.2 
In the NUPI project ‘Cyber Security Capacity Building’ (2015–2016) 
we have mapped out concrete risks and challenges, produced recom-
mendations for dealing with them and provided suggestions for imple-
menting these tools effectively. (In addition to the present project report, 
see Klimburg and Zylberberg 2015, Muller 2015, and Langø 2016.) 
These three reports provide micro-perspectives, through in-depth as-
sessment of various angles of specific issues pertaining to cyber security. 
The present summarizing report draws on these reports in addition to 
recent research, offering an up-to-date research assessment of the over-
all picture: the macro-perspective. Among the questions pursued in the 
NUPI project were: 
 What are the extent and nature of cyber challenges in developing 
countries? 
 How does this affect Western security? 
 Do various countries’ cyber security models share certain fea-
tures that can be replicated in developing countries? 
 How do the roles and mandates of various government agencies, 
the private sector and the civil society in industrialized countries 
differ? 
 Could there be a conflict between Western and developing coun-
tries’ security interests in these models? 
 What has been done in terms of capacity building? – a mapping 
exercise  
 What are the context-dependent technical, political, governmen-
tal, societal and economic factors that need to be taken into ac-
count? 
                                                          
2  CCB was initially more concerned with economic issues, followed by international 
security agendas and human rights. The development context is the latest addition 
to this field (see Klimburg and Zylberberg 2015: 5) 
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This report draws on and further develops the analyses of these ques-
tions presented in the other three reports, in order to assess the extent to 
which CCB in developing countries has merit, and whether effects have 
been limited to the regional environment or are more global in reach. 
The first project report ‘Cyber Security Capacity Building in Developing 
Countries: Challenges and Opportunities’ (Muller 2015) focuses on chal-
lenges to implementation of cyber security, offering an overview and dis-
cussion of different approaches to CCB. The second project report, ‘Cyber 
Security Capacity Building: Developing Access’ (Klimburg and Zylber-
berg 2015), provides a rationale and identifies potential dimensions for 
governmental cyber security capacity building and what tasks they 
should cover. Frameworks and recommendations for assessing and de-
livering CCB programmes are outlined. The third project report ‘Cyber 
Security Capacity Building: Security and Freedom’ (Langø 2016) is con-
cerned with the intersection of technology and politics in developing 
countries, and in particular with digitalization in developing countries 
in transitions towards democracies.    
Drawing on the project findings and the three reports, the present re-
port concludes with some overall recommendations for policymakers re-
garding possible Norwegian involvement in building cyber security ca-
pacity in the developing world.  
The NUPI project has identified three main reasons why CCB will be 
increasingly important for the development–security nexus: 1) Access to 
cyberspace is essential to social, economic and political stability, so the 
importance of, and need for, CCB measures and programmes for regional 
stability will grow. 2) Developing countries are increasingly becoming 
host to the infrastructure and actors behind malicious cyber activities. 
Bridging the digital divide is important also with regard to responding to 
national security and various types of cyber threats in donor countries. 
3) The international debate about governing the Internet is becoming in-
creasingly politicized. Many developing countries hold swing-state posi-
tions in this political landscape, and their influence and importance are 
likely to grow (Klimburg and Zylberberg 2015). Thus, CCB seems set to 
become an increasingly important arena for international diplomacy. 
Furthermore, because of the increasing dependence on cyber space in 
all sectors of society around the world, it is important to have a holistic 
and comprehensive approach to new questions raised by the digital 
technological revolution. Norway has the comparative advantage of a 
long track record within the development industry, but also as regards 
multilateral diplomatic negotiations. Combining these two dimensions 
could offer great potentials for strengthening Norwegian long-term in-
terests such as the production of new norms, as well as following up on 
SDG commitments by contributing to the digital revolution in develop-
ing countries.  
 
Background 
Information and communication technology (ITC) is nothing new. The 
first undersea telegraph cable /under the Atlantic Ocean/ was laid in 
1858 by the Atlantic Telegraph Company. The International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU) was founded in 1865, and became a UN agency 
in 1947. The ARPANET (predecessor to the Internet) was created in 
1969; the first email was sent in 1971; the first Internet worm or mal-
ware was detected in 1988; and in 1993, the Internet and the World 
Wide Web were made publicly accessible and free. Although information 
and communication technology has been around for more than a cen-
tury, digitalization and cyber space represent a fairly new field in inter-
national politics (global economic, security and human rights agendas), 
even more recent in the field of development politics.  
In 1999, the first UN resolution addressing cyber security was 
adopted, marking the starting point for a multilateral, intergovernmen-
tal effort to address cyber security. The first UN resolution pertaining to 
digitalization and development came in 2001, when the General Assem-
bly decided that a World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 
should be held. The first meeting took place in Geneva in 2003, the sec-
ond meeting in Tunis in 2005; these were followed up by a WSIS+10 in 
New York in 2015. Because the goal of the first meeting was to provide 
the foundations for an information society for all, this meeting had im-
plications for development politics as well.3 In 2004, the Partnership on 
Measuring ICT for Development was launched as a multi-stakeholder in-
itiative to improve the situation in developing countries. In Tunis in 
2005, the second WSIS meeting emphasized implementation and fi-
nancing mechanisms, as well as Internet governance. Multiple stake-
holders broadly supported the outcome resolution of the Geneva and the 
Tunis meetings. Since then, and particularly in the last five years, the 
pace of policymaking has increased rapidly. Highways for policymaking 
have been produced, especially as regards cyber security, cyber crime 
and Internet governance. Now the cyber and development highway also 
seems to be gaining momentum. In 2015, the WSIS+10 High-level meet-
ings made recommendations on how to proceed so as to further connect 
developing countries, and called on all ‘… governments, the private sec-
tor, civil society, international organizations, the technical and aca-
demic communities and all other relevant stakeholders to integrate in-
formation and communication technologies (ICTs) in their implementa-
tion approaches to the SDGs’ (WSIS 2015: bullet point 17).  
                                                          
3  175 countries were represented, together with international organizations, private 
sector and civil society at the meeting in Geneva, where they endorsed the Geneva 
Declaration of Principles and Geneva Plan of Action, adopted 12. December 2003. 
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The 2030 agenda for sustainable development goals (SDG), adopted 
by the United Nations on 25 September 2015, was designed to combat 
poverty, inequality and climate change. These overarching goals, fur-
ther specified into 17 goals and 169 targets, are by many seen in con-
junction with the spread of new technology (see for instance World Bank 
2016, Bildt 2015). New ITCs are contributing to growth and develop-
ment in developing countries through increased productivity, by provid-
ing public and private services to people in rural and poor areas and by 
promoting new economic and social opportunities to people living in de-
veloping countries. The connections between technology and growth 
have also been confirmed through statistics on the use of information 
technology and the extent to which countries are connected correlates 
with increases in GDP (WDR 2016: 3).  
Since 2000, there has been a considerable increase in connectivity, 
creating new tools for economic and social development – and there is 
no reason to believe that this trend will not continue. The UN (2015: 7) 
has estimated that the number of mobile phone subscriptions had in-
creased from 2.2 billion in 2005 to 7.1 billion by 2015. Furthermore, 3.2 
billion people (of whom 2 billion are from developing countries) are ex-
pected to have online access by the end of 2015. These technologies are 
being adopted at such a speed that they are reaching many of those who 
remain below the poverty threshold. For these people, ICT represent an 
entry ticket to formal networks to communicate, to transact and access 
basic financial services, to obtain information, and to demand their 
rights and recognition. In January 2016, the World Bank issued its an-
nual world development report, devoted in its entirety to digitalization 
and development, and focusing on unrealized digital dividends. Concur-
ring with UN estimates, the World Bank also highlighted the number of 
people still untouched by the digital revolution:  
Only around 15 percent can afford access to broadband Internet. Mo-
bile phones, reaching almost four-fifths of the world’s people, pro-
vide the main form of Internet access in developing countries. But 
even then, nearly 2 billion people do not own a mobile phone, and 
nearly 60 percent of the world’s population has no access to the In-
ternet. The world’s offline population is mainly in India and China, 
but more than 120 million people are still offline in North America 
(…) In Africa, the digital divide across demographic groups remains 
considerable. Women are less likely than men to use or own digital 
technologies. Gaps are even larger between youth (20 percent) and 
those more than 45 years old (8 percent). (World Bank 2016: 6–7). 
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Connections have been made between the WSIS+10 and the UN SDGs, 
such as action lines for achieving these goals through ICT.4 These initia-
tives, together with the World Bank report, have drawn considerable in-
ternational attention to this agenda, and ICT is increasingly and rapidly 
becoming a precondition for sustainable development. Carl Bildt, former 
prime minister and foreign minister of Sweden, is among those who have 
argued that information technology has the potential to become the 
most important tool for development to billions of people living in Africa 
and Asia (Bildt 2015). In policy circles and documents concerned with 
development politics, these technologies are increasingly becoming a 
core focus of development strategies. However, unless accompanied by 
a focus on cyber security, development will be hollow and thereby un-
sustainable.  
Donor countries and international organizations seize on digitaliza-
tion as an opportunity for fighting poverty. However, digitalization in 
countries that suffer from lack of development, poor governance and 
poverty may provide new breeding grounds for organized crime, terror-
ism, and cyber security challenges. Thus, a new dimension of social vul-
nerability follows in the wake of the development opportunities offered 
by the digital revolution. Baseline studies have demonstrated the gap 
between the development goals and intentions in donor policies, and 
digital vulnerability and cyber security in developing countries.5 In order 
to be sustainable, digital development must be followed up by a focus 
on digital security.   
This can be accomplished through core development and aid activi-
ties, and projects focused on improving the analogue foundations for 
digital technology, including knowledge, information, education, em-
ployment and institutions.  
 
                                                          
4  See: https://www.itu.int/net4/wsis/sdg/Content/wsis-sdg_booklet.pdf and 
http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Documents/UNPAN95707.pdf in par-
ticular bulletpoint 4.  
5  Myanmar: http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/Country_Profi-
les/Myanmar.pdf 
 Tanzania: http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/Country_Pro-
files/Tanzania.pdf 
Digital dividends in developing 
countries  
In 2015 the World Bank published its new global poverty estimates, con-
firming that the target of halving the rate of extreme poverty was 
achieved seven years ahead of schedule. The new goal of eradicating ex-
treme poverty in the course of the next 15 years has now been endorsed 
by the UN through the SDGs. Some claim that it will be possible to 
achieve this, because the developing world is fundamentally changing 
thanks to the connectivity made possible by digital networks. However, 
even though the digitalization of developing countries is spreading rap-
idly, achieving faster growth, more jobs, better services and the broader 
benefits is likely to be more difficult (World Bank 2016).  
In the following, I group the challenges that obstruct the realization 
of digital dividends in developing countries under two headings i) weak 
technological environment, ii) poor network infrastructure and urban-
centred digitalization.  
i) Weak technological environment 
The need to build the correct environment for technology before busi-
nesses can begin to thrive and then reap the benefits of digital connec-
tivity has been emphasized by international organizations and policy-
makers (see for instance ITU 2012, WDR 2016). Research has pointed in 
the similar direction, like the study by Klimburg and Zylberberg (2015) 
and the Dalberg Report (2013) Based on a survey of more than 1300 
businesses, 1000 small and medium-sized enterprises and extensive in-
terviews in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal, the Dalberg Report maps 
the impact of the Internet as a force for growth and social change. It de-
scribes the digitalization of these countries as a work in progress, with 
the potential still largely untapped. Further, the Dalberg Report calls for 
more and better information that can guide policymakers and investors 
in capitalizing on this potential, and stresses that countries will need to 
invest in infrastructure and the broader ecosystem for innovation. It fur-
ther identifies ‘core infrastructure’ and ‘conditions for usage’ as the two 
key pillars for a well-functioning Internet economy (2013: 9). The Dal-
berg Report highlights how core infrastructure requires an environment 
not just with mobile and Internet access, but also with electricity, skills, 
knowledge, education and awareness of corruption. Establishing such 
an environment is dependent of a set of conditions for usage such as 
costs, education, and relevance of services. These conditions are in turn 
influenced by degree of access, relevance, availability and attractive-
ness. In other words, digital dividends need to be built on analogue 
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foundations. Core traditional development politics and projects become 
central elements for bridging the digital divide.  
In order to illustrate and contextualize the importance of this aspect, 
let me offer a few empirical snapshots from developing countries cur-
rently experiencing rapid digitalization.  
Botswana has one of the highest percentages of Internet subscribers 
on the African continent. The digitalization of Botswana has mush-
roomed: there have been substantial investments in digital infrastruc-
ture; the country scores high on Internet usage; Botswana has a national 
policy on Internet distribution and access points (including rural areas), 
and the highest percentage of social media users on the sub-Saharan 
mainland. Such statistics would indicate that Botswana has indeed be-
come an Internet society – but, looking beyond these figures and study-
ing the actual impact of digitalization on people’s everyday lives, the pic-
ture is rather different. Examining Botswana’s two major industries –  di-
amonds and cattle farming – the anthropologist Jo Helle-Valle demon-
strates the relevance, or lack of relevance, of digital technology and the 
Internet in the lives of ordinary people (2015). The diamond industry is 
global and very much controlled by foreign capital, and through these 
connections the industry might be said to be fully digitalized. However, 
as Helle-Valle notes: ‘… the Botswana work-force in this sector is typi-
cally manual labour, with little or no digital technological competence 
being required’ (2015: 3). In this important sector Botswana is not very 
digitalized, nor is there perceived to be any great need for this.  
The situation in the cattle industry is very different. Helle-Valle shows 
how broad and innovative ICT projects have led to effective management 
of the national stock and a thriving export industry. Thanks to new tech-
nology, most of the cattle in Botswana are now included in a system 
which, by means of digital chips in each animal, can monitor and iden-
tify sickness, ownership, breed, theft, etc. The data can be read through 
handheld devices such as smartphones, tablets or computers, and are 
loaded into large databases. (Helle-Valle 2015: 3). Through this system, 
cattle owners can communicate more easily with veterinaries as well as 
buyers and sellers.  
Digital technology has also been used in Africa to strengthen internal 
solidarity and economic growth. In Kenya, fundraising campaigns 
through mobile phones and social media have raised considerable 
amounts of money for famine relief in the northeast of the country. In 
2007, the telecom company Safricom launched a mobile money service 
called M-PESA which attracted six million customers within two years, 
transferring billions annually. Through M-PESA, people without bank 
accounts could leapfrog from traditional brick-and-mortar finance to 
digital economy (Mbogo 2010, Bright and Hruby 2015). The launch of 
M-PESA sparked a series of digital innovations in the country. Ushahidi, 
‘Teach a person how to surf’: Cyber security as development assistance 13 
an app for digitally and rapidly reporting and tracking outbreaks of vio-
lence in connection with elections, was also launched in 2007; in the 
following year it became an international tech company based in Ngong 
Road, or what has become known as the Silicon Savannah, the tech-hub 
of East Africa. In 2011, the Kenyan Red Cross together with Safaricom 
led the Kenyans for Kenya campaign, raising almost 12 million dollars 
in four weeks for aid during a severe famine. The social media were also 
used to inform and coordinate help during the Westgate crisis, and the 
Kenyan Red Cross employed the social media to get blood donors follow-
ing the attack (Were: 2013). A few years earlier such mobilization would 
not have been possible.  
Another country that is now surfing the digital wave is Rwanda. Con-
siderable investments have been made in ICT technology in schools as 
well as in infrastructure, aiming to ‘… strengthen skills training centres 
and develop an ICT culture in schools as a means of creating a critical 
mass of IT professionals’ (Tafirenyika 2011). Furthermore, together with 
the Rwandan government, the Kigali Bus Service has invested in a cash-
less, card-based public transport ticketing system known as twende. By 
2015, more than 30,000 customers had signed up for this system. This 
initiative was part of the government’s Smart Kigali programme for rapid 
modernization and digitalization of the capital city (Dusabirane 2015). 
While the digital dividends in the cattle industry in Botswana, in the 
social media campaigns in Kenya and the digitalization programmes in 
Rwanda are evident, there are still many hurdles to be dealt with before 
most people in these countries can enjoy extensive use of the Internet, 
the most important hurdle being economic. Although the importance of 
being connected is recognized, the consumer costs are still too high for 
most people to be able to afford to use the social media and the Internet 
on a daily basis. The World Bank also highlights this aspect, and how 
the bottom billion are reaping only a modest share of the digital divi-
dends:  
In the Central African Republic, one month of internet access costs 
more than 1.5 times the annual per capita income. Even mobile 
phones are expensive: the median mobile phone owner in Africa 
spends over 13 percent of her monthly income on phone calls and 
texting. And many poor lack the basic literacy and numeracy skills 
needed to use the internet. (World Bank 2016: 16)  
The digital gap is closely linked to the economic gap: the ‘haves’ can 
make use of the new technology and reap digital dividends, while the 
‘have-nots’ are left behind. This is where development efforts can make 
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a difference. By helping to bridge this infrastructural gap, donor coun-
tries can play a key role in contributing to improve the technological 
business environment in developing countries.6  
ii) Poor network and infrastructure – urban-centred  
     digitalization 
In measuring the availability, accessibility and affordability of digital 
network and infrastructure, the World Bank has divided this infrastruc-
ture into three miles: i) the first mile is where the Internet enters a coun-
try, ii) the middle mile is where the Internet spread through the country, 
and iii) the last mile is the level where the Internet actually reaches the 
end users. Additionally, the invisible mile, which concerns important 
but less visible elements necessary for maintaining the integrity of the 
three levels of the infrastructure, is often included in this division of in-
frastructure (World Bank 2016: 205).  
Much has been done in African countries in order to improve the first 
mile and the international gateway, the point where countries connect 
to the global Internet. Since 2009, thousands of kilometres of undersea 
broadband cables along the coasts of East Africa (see e.g. SEACOM) and 
West Africa (see e.g. WACS) have been bringing faster Internet to the 
continent. These cables provide countries such as Djibouti, Ghana, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, 
Sudan and Tanzania, and with high-speed Internet. While governments 
can negotiate higher Internet speed, better prices and greater band-
width, user conditions and Internet accessibility/availability are very 
much conditioned by the middle mile, the national backbone and inter-
city networks. These, in turn, depend on the degree of competition be-
tween public and private actors in the country. The rules of the market 
competition vary from one country to another, and affect the user side of 
digital networks and infrastructure. Liberalizing the market for the mid-
dle mile is an effective way of providing open access and Internet to end 
users – but, as the World Bank has pointed out, this entails a risk ‘… that 
the most popular routes – say, between the two main cities – are ‘super-
served’ while the rest of the country is underserved.’ (2016: 219)  
In developing countries, the last mile is rarely served through fixed 
copper cables, as local access to networks is dominated by wireless al-
ternatives. This is where the digitalization trajectory of developing coun-
tries differs the most from developed countries, due largely to the prob-
lem of the fixed vs wireless networks. Whereas the developed countries 
                                                          
6  Various methodological models for fostering more efficient cyber security capacity 
building have been developed; for an overview see Klimburg and Zylberberg 2015: 
20–26, and Muller 2015. 
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had achieved almost universal fixed-line access before wireless technol-
ogy took over around 2001, most developing countries never built fixed-
line networks. The World Bank sees this point as important  
… because wireless networks […] are not fully substitutable for fixed 
networks […] either in usage (which rarely offers flat-rate pricing, 
without data limits) or in performance (where speeds are generally 
lower) […] many developing countries are stuck with a second-class 
internet that may fail to deliver the expected benefits, especially for 
business users. (2016: 208)  
The 2016 World Bank report goes on to describe how developing coun-
tries will have to struggle to achieve a fully and sufficient middle mile or 
national backbone. Some developing countries may achieve such a 
backbone through private–public partnership, but creating fixed-line 
networks in rural areas is still challenging and not very likely. Moreover, 
according to the report, fragile countries such as DR Congo and South 
Sudan are unlikely to ever get fixed-line access, even in urban areas. 
Klimburg and Zylberberg (2015: 9) note the importance of internet avail-
ability and an adequate backbone network infrastructure, network own-
ership and geographic patterns of network development as key for better 
business environments and improved digital dividends. Furthermore, 
they claim that this situation creates ‘… few incentives for local actors to 
either build network capacity in mostly rural areas or to expand network 
coverage. Development efforts need to focus on bridging this infrastruc-
tural gap, as a key determinant in an enabling business environment’ 
(ibid.). Other countries, such as Botswana, Burkina Faso, the Central Af-
rican Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Kenya, 
Rwanda Swaziland, Tanzania and Togo completely lacked the last mile 
(WDR 2016: 255). In these countries analogue foundations for digital 
enterprises are weak, and there are no incentives for digital companies, 
such as online retailers. Unless global development initiatives intervene, 
these developments point towards a trajectory of urban-centred digitali-
zation in the developing world, with new kinds of societal vulnerabili-
ties. 
Developing countries and new 
kinds of societal vulnerabilities  
ICT has become a highly important foundation for most infrastructures 
in developed societies, and the developing countries are now following 
in their path. Individuals, businesses and nations are depending more 
and more on data and systems in the virtual world.  In this global transi-
tion into the digital era it is easy to forget that the Internet was not in-
vented for carrying the critical features and infrastructure that it does 
today, including key societal sectors such as energy, power, economy, 
health, communications and transport. The increasing interconnected-
ness of these features implies a major change in the societal risk factors 
facing us today, and also highlights the tight linkages between the do-
mestic and international dimensions of politics. Global, complex and 
rapidly shifting trends impinge on domestic political contexts, espe-
cially along the security dimension. Along with the opportunities and 
possibilities shaped by the digital revolution come new, more transna-
tional challenges to major areas of societal infrastructural as well as in-
dustry, innovation and business. These threats cannot be reduced to 
technological concerns, as they are interconnected with international 
politics and global trends. Fragile states with poor infrastructure and 
governance are rapidly being connected to the Internet – but the digital-
ization of these countries is hollow. This hollowness can provide room 
for cyberspace actors with bad intentions that will affect not only domes-
tic problems in developing countries and fragile states, but global soci-
ety as well.  
Although developing countries are following in the path of developed 
countries and becoming more digitalized, they are taking a different 
route. For the developed countries, digitalization has been a long-term 
sequential evolution: initially based on state-led investments in fixed 
telephone infrastructure, it was followed by private initiatives and inno-
vations, and then, building on this infrastructure established gradually 
over more than a hundred years, came the addition of mobile phones, 
smartphones and the Internet. Developing countries, by contrast, are 
leapfrogging straight into wireless technology and mobile and internet 
networks that are often built by the private sector (which obviates the 
need for investments in wiring with expensive copper cables). Jumping 
into the digital age has provided developing countries with digital tech-
nology, new opportunities and better connectedness. But the introduc-
tion of technology in these societies has been proceeding far more rap-
idly than the building of state institutions and other mechanisms that 
can manage new challenges arising from this technology. Digital tech-
nologies are being put to use before good, functional regulatory mecha-
nisms have been developed and put in place. The resultant shortcomings 
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– in state mechanisms, institutions, coordination mechanisms, private 
mechanisms, general awareness, public knowledge and skills – open the 
way to new kinds of vulnerabilities.     
Developing countries become digitalized rapidly, but they are weak 
in the knowhow, awareness, institutions and skills needed for dealing 
with cyber security issues. This vulnerability can be met through devel-
opment assistance from donor countries to projects and activities focus-
ing on awareness, knowledge, information, education and employment. 
In this context, Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB) becomes integral 
to development.7 Linking CCB to the SDGs can strengthen the sustaina-
bility aspect of these goals. Moreover, the dissemination of accurate in-
formation regarding security and structural aspects of the Internet is 
likely to make developing countries more competent actors on the global 
arena where international cyber politics is developed, and thus better 
positioned to exert influence on their own position in the future. 
 
Box 1. From an interview with Hans Christian Pretorius (Head of department at the Nor-
wegian National Security Authority (NSM)) 
 
Because of the borderless nature of cyberspace, many have held that risks are not 
confined to countries and regions. This indicates that cyber security is only as strong 
as the weakest link, which in turn implies that weak cyber security in one country 
negatively affects global cyber security. Following this logic, enhancing cyber security 
in one place will benefit the larger system and the international community at large. 
However, this theory is contested, and we at the NSM do not consider fragile states 
with weak institutions a direct threat to Norwegian cyber security in this manner. Nev-
ertheless, Norway should be doing cyber security capacity building in developing 
countries and fragile states – but, instead of being motivated by the need to enhance 
Norwegian cyber security by securing the weakest link, this should be motivated by 
more traditional Norwegian developmental concerns. In order to combat poverty and 
ensure regional stability, cyber security needs to be an integral part of development.  
        In our view, among the security challenges for developing countries embracing 
the digital revolution is the global trend towards buying better cyber security from 
private companies. Furthermore, national cyber policy usually does not affect the pri-
vate sector in particular – on the contrary, there are often conflicting concerns be-
tween commercial interests and security interests. Private companies are free to de-
cide how much risk they want to take, and expensive cyber security measures may 
not always be prioritized in developing countries. This can contribute to further hol-
lowing the digitalization of developing countries, expanding the digital divide be-
tween developed and developing countries. This challenge could be confronted if de-
veloping countries’ cyber security capacity building strategies were followed up by 
implementation and legislative changes. Because digitalization is primarily driven by 
commercial interests, this also calls for increased public–private cooperation in the 
development sector. Additionally, developing countries should be trained in gearing 
themselves to become part of the international CERT (Computer Emergency Response 
Team) cooperation, and Norway could help facilitate such teams through capacity 
building and lifting the knowledge and expertise in developing countries about 
CERTs.  
 
                                                          
7  See also Pawlak 2014. 
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The Security/Development nexus 
Drawing on the scholarly tradition on the security/development nexus, 
Klimburg and Zylberberg (2015) identify CCB as a key component of de-
velopment. They hold that this combination is particularly important be-
cause:  
… the areas with the highest potential of economic growth correspond 
roughly with those where the security risks are the highest [and] the 
skills developed locally through cyber security trainings correspond 
to those needed to enable local businesses to scale up, without hav-
ing to rely on outside, more expensive talent. (Klimburg and Zylber-
berg 2015: 10) 
CCB generally includes three categories: technological, human and or-
ganizational resources. Although helping to provide access to infor-
mation and communication technology is seen as an important part of 
the development agenda (WDR 2016), it is the building of institutional 
and human resources that should be the main priorities of donor coun-
tries’ development politics. 
Botswana, Kenya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Rwanda and Tanzania are 
developing countries experiencing a rapid growth of digitalization and 
digital connectivity. This connectivity fuels a fundamental transfor-
mation in these countries’ social, political and economic spheres, chang-
ing people’s everyday lives. The up-side of this digital revolution is that 
it can help people out of poverty, and turn the economies in some Afri-
can countries into some of the fastest growing in the world. When entre-
preneurs, farmers or fishermen can receive and transfer money digitally 
through the Internet it becomes easier and safer to run small and me-
dium-sized businesses. Connectivity also makes it possible to compare 
prices and different markets, which farmers, fishermen as well as small 
and medium-sized businesses can put to good use.  
However, along with the up-sides come some down-sides. The digital 
trajectories of developing countries involve a different set of cyber 
threats than those in the developed world (Subrahmanian et al. 2015). 
Nir Kshetri has described the digitalization of the Global South as char-
acterized by a certain hollowness (2013: 153), involving different things 
for different entities. For instance, it may refer to weak institutions, poor 
organizational and individual defence mechanisms, better recruitment 
basis due to high unemployment and low wages, and a lack of capacity 
to manage risks and vulnerabilities in society (Kshetri 2010: 1057). Bot-
herders8 and other cyber criminals tend to come from locations where 
                                                          
8  A botnet consists of many internet-connected computers where components com-
municate and coordinate actions that can be used to send spam email of ddos (dis-
triuted denial-of-service) attacks (Coleman 2015: 93). A bot herder or a botnet herder 
is a person who controls and maintains a botnet by installing malicious software in 
numerous machines, putting these machines into his or her control. These machines 
can then be used to attack or infect other machines.  
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high-paying IT jobs are rare or unavailable (Sullivan 2007); and in de-
veloping countries the growth of IT jobs is lower than the growth of In-
ternet penetration (Kshetri 2010: 1071).  
The lack of capacity can be due to technological, behavioural and pol-
icy-related factors. Generating innovation, primarily driven by commer-
cial forces, without attention to security has left a digital hollowness in 
these developing countries which makes it easy to target unprotected de-
vices and unskilled users which in turn makes these countries attractive 
for cyber criminals. Developing countries also lack the resources to build 
institutions to combat transnational crime (Cuellar 2004). Laws that rec-
ognize cyber crime, law enforcement mechanisms, personnel who un-
derstand cyber crime, as well as the awareness necessary for dealing 
with cyber crime – all these remain inadequate.  Given their weak insti-
tutions, limited capacity, and generally low resources for fighting cyber 
crime, these countries are likely to remain attractive for cyber-criminals 
also in the future.  
Without attentions to analogue foundations, there is a risk that this 
hollowness will escalate when developing countries invest in more so-
phisticated ICT technology and digital connectivity. In addition to in-
vestments in security measures such as anti-virus programmes, there is 
also a need to improve basic knowledge about ICT. Poor and fragile in-
stitutions in many developing countries have contributed to this digital 
hollowness. Franz-Stefan Gady, a senior fellow at the EastWest Institute 
and founding member of the Worldwide Cyber Security Initiative, has 
noted the statistics on the high numbers of PCs infected with viruses and 
malware in Africa and how these computers are easy targets for botnet 
operators (2010). Several experts have pointed out how rogue states and 
developing countries become hosts to outlaw servers, also called bullet-
proof hosting. The hosts of these servers operate beyond the reach of 
most law enforcers and enable cyber crime elsewhere (Palmer 2016, 
Goncharov 2015). Others have highlighted how certain vulnerabilities 
in the global network such as on the SS7 (the network that allows cellu-
lar carriers to route calls, text and other services to each other), which 
was built in the 1980ies, can be used by people with illicit intentions for 
surveillance and may undermine the privacy of cellular customers (Lan-
dau 2010). Through the SS7 “... a single carrier in Congo or Kazakhstan 
[…] could be used to hack into cellular networks in the United States, 
Europe or anywhere else.” (Timberg 2014).  
In 2011 Immacuate Karambu pointed out that little was being spent 
on cyber security, also in the financial sector. In 2011 only 40% of banks 
in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were prepared against cyber threats 
(Kshetri 2013: 159). Weak institutions and law enforcement mecha-
nisms on cyber crime contribute further to the digital hollowness of de-
veloping countries. Digitalization can be a key factor for economic and 
social development, and even democratization, but such a development 
also opens new frontiers for criminals and others with bad intentions. As 
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Langø has argued: ‘ICT can potentially be either a boon or a threat to 
democracy: it can aid peaceful opposition or violent rebellion; help gov-
ernments enforce the rule of law or repress the population.’ (2016: 5). 
Policymakers concerned with building cyber security capacity should 
take such threats and risks into account when engaging in developing 
countries. The prior analogue foundations in a country very often deter-
mine the direction of the digitalization.9  
 
Box 2. Interview with Telenor Group 
 
Telenor is among the major mobile operators in the world, with more than 200 mil-
lion mobile subscriptions, and is present in markets with 1.3 billion people. Sev-
eral of these are developing countries. Telenor has an ambition to connect 200 mil-
lion people to the Internet by 2017 facilitating access to knowledge, opportunities 
and vital services also in developing countries.  
 
Among the challenges in connecting developing countries to wireless communica-
tion technology are those pertaining to lawful interception, authority requests, sur-
veillance and privacy. Awareness-building information campaigns and gatherings 
with constellations of authorities, local authorities, international organizations, 
national organizations, NGOs, private actors, senior networks and women’s net-
works may considerably improve the cyber security level within a country. The 
awareness dimension and the facilitation of various niche capabilities like CERTs 
and institution building are also areas where Norwegian expertise could be ex-
ported and contribute to counteracting the hollow digitalization of developing 
countries. 
 
 
Not only within the individual developing country, but also in the region 
and furthermore as host for malicious activities, CCB in these developing 
countries can ultimately impact on the security of donor countries as 
well. In order for economic and social development to be sustainable, 
and in order to achieve the goals of the international community to com-
bat poverty and inequality by 2030, cyber security must be recognized 
as a key element; and needs assessments of developing countries’ cyber 
security maturity should be included as an important mapping activity 
towards achieving these goals.10  
Digital hollowness must be addressed comprehensively, and 
cyber/capacity needs should be understood and contextualized in con-
nection with core conditions for economic and social growth in develop-
ing countries.  This includes the rule of law, education, programmes to 
promote small and medium-sized businesses, as well as donor pro-
grammes facilitating participation of developing countries (civil society 
                                                          
9  See for instance Wagley 2014, and Langø 2016: 18–19. 
10  For an overview of different models measuring cyber capacity maturity in developing 
countries see Muller 2015: 7–10. 
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and governments) in the multi-stakeholder approach to Internet govern-
ance. 
 
Box 3. From an interview with Margrete Raaum (FIRST Norway) 
 
FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams) is an international confed-
eration of trusted computer incident response teams. FIRST was established in 
1990, one year after the CERT Coordination Center was created. As of 2016, FIRST 
has 345 teams in 74 countries. These teams cooperatively handle computer security 
incidents and offer education/training programmes and fellowships to developing 
countries. The fellowships are established to build capacities in developing coun-
tries so that they can match FIRST’s requirements for joining the training pro-
grammes. FIRST has a limited number of Fellowships, but is open to partnering with 
organizations that are willing to contribute to the fellowship programme. In this way 
there is an opening for MfAs, or other sponsors, to strategically sponsor such fel-
lowships in developing countries on their focus lists. The fellowship programme 
stretches over a period of five years.  
 
Through FIRST programmes, local activities pertaining to cyber security in develop-
ing countries are facilitated and built upon. FIRST can arrange small-scale confer-
ences in developing countries that are already on FIRST programmes, in a fellow-
ship, or seek to join the programme, such as Botswana, Uganda, Ghana, Mauritius 
and Tanzania, as well as several countries in South America. In these conferences 
FIRST typically collaborates with local organizations and provides trainers and edu-
cation. 
 
The training programmes are focused on teaching how CERTs can be established, 
what requirements and conditions must be met in order to establish a CERT, and 
what kinds of functions the CERTs are intended to have. Through the training pro-
grammes, FIRST offers a CERT start-up kit to developing countries that match FIRST’s 
list of requirements. The programme runs for a three-year period.  
 
FIRST feel that the rapid digitalization of developing countries is not being followed 
up with security measures. This leads to new kinds of security concerns pertaining 
to, for instance, the financial sector and the energy sector in these countries. There-
fore, many developing countries are eager to establish government CERTs in order 
to protect the government from cyber threats. Furthermore, through their CERTs, de-
veloping countries may gain a point of contact for international cooperation on cyber 
security issues. In this way CERTs also contribute to making developing countries 
more visible and involved in international cyber -security processes.   
 
From the perspective of FIRST Norway, building cyber security capacity should focus 
on establishing CERTs and protect governments from cyber threats, but also on pro-
tecting critical infrastructure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
International cyber politics and  
developing countries as potential 
swing-states 
Inter-country exchange of information and experience gained is an im-
portant element in producing and developing new international cyber 
politics. Because of the rapid development of ICT, and the even more 
rapid pace of connectivity across the globe, old political challenges in 
international relations resurface in new and sometimes unexpected 
ways. In this political landscape there is a dire need for new norms, pol-
icies and trust. The multi-stakeholder approach, hailed as a way forward 
in international relations concerned with cyberspace, involves states, in-
ternational organizations, private actors, think-tanks and NGOs. In this 
way, cyberspace as a political topic in international relations incorpo-
rates new kinds of partnerships. There has been considerable research 
on international relations, global governance and international organi-
zation, but only a marginal part of this work has been engaged with cy-
berspace and how it is changing well-established patterns in interna-
tional relations. While international bodies like the UN, EU and NATO 
are important players in developing international cyberspace policy, 
they are not able to fully incorporate the multi-stakeholder approach in-
volving, for instance, big private enterprises like Google, Facebook or 
Huawei. On the other hand, as long as the technological revolution is 
run by the private sector, these actors have no formal say in international 
organizations such as the UN.11 Thus while maintaining its focus and 
prioritized collaboration with international organizations (the UN, EU, 
NATO, AU, etc.) Norway should also seek ways of working together with 
major private enterprises, perhaps especially in connection with devel-
opment and aid.   
Another challenge is that many governments in the developing world 
lack the knowledge, awareness and mature policies about cyberspace 
and cyber security necessary for participating fully in the global arena. 
In this context there are potentials for donor countries to incorporate 
CCB into their more traditional focus on development concerned with in-
stitution building, cooperating with states, civil society and NGOs, de-
veloping various kinds of partnerships. Embarking on such programmes 
can contribute to new partnerships, and sustainable development with 
                                                          
11   The multi-stakeholder process seems to be gaining a footing also in international 
bodies like the UN. Although the majority of those speaking at the December 2015 
WSIS+10 meeting at the UN General Assembly were state representatives, it should 
be noted that spokespersons from several private companies also took the floor. 
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social and economic growth, as well as giving donor countries an ad-
vantage in the global arena of international cyber policy. As pointed out 
in a recent NUPI report, the dichotomous character of current interna-
tional cyber policy on how Internet should be governed implies that ‘… 
the importance of the ‘swing-states’ – nearly all within the developing 
world – rises’ (Klimburg and Zylberberg: 2015: 46). Collaboration 
among academic institutions, national and international organizational, 
and decisionmakers from donor and recipient countries seems the most 
natural way to explore these links and to identify potential CCB pro-
grammes for development policy where such partnerships can be built. 
Development, local ownership and 
cyber space 
Most donor-driven development assistance is in one way or another con-
cerned with the ‘ownership debate’. Although not yet very prominent in 
policy documents, this debate is also relevant for CCB projects. The term 
‘ownership’ has a long trajectory in development traditions and needs 
further clarification here, in order to connect it to CCB.  
In development work, the term local ownership emerged in the report 
of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1996. This 
document highlighted the importance of locally owned development 
strategies, defining local people in their relation to donors. Such owner-
ship built on an idea that had featured within the development sphere 
for some time: that aid would be more effective if the recipients could 
control how it was being used. This view has since been adopted by the 
World Bank, the OECD, the UNDP, and a great many NGOs. Local own-
ership was one of the principles of the 2005 Paris Declaration on aid ef-
fectiveness, later followed up in Accra (2008) and Busan (2011).  
The debate on ownership has also been an important one in interna-
tional peacebuilding and statebuilding engagements. In peacebuilding 
the role of local and national ownership in maintaining the legitimacy of 
the activities is highlighted: 
Effective approaches to national and local ownership not only rein-
force the perceived legitimacy […] and support mandate implementa-
tion, they also help to ensure the sustainability of any national capac-
ity. (UN DPKO/DFS 2008: 39)  
The UN further highlights that a precondition for national and local own-
ership is a strong understanding of the national political and wider so-
cio-economic context (ibid.). Donors see local ownership as critical for 
the successful implementation, legitimacy and sustainability of devel-
opment projects. According to UN and World Bank policy documents, 
the primary way of doing this is through dialogue, but also: ‘Political, 
financial and other forms of international leverage may be required to 
influence the parties on specific issues, but those should only be used in 
support of the wider aspirations’ (UN DPKO/DFS 2008: 41).  
The concept of ‘ownership’ has remained vague. It is used to refer to 
several different things, and there seems to be a tension between theory 
and practice. As employed in the Paris Declaration, the term can refer to 
control over decisions, development policies, strategies and coordina-
tion of development actions (de Renzio, Whitfield & Bergamaschi 2008). 
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But it may also refer to commitment to a set of policies, regardless of the 
process and actors behind the making of these policies (ibid.). As Axel 
Borchgrevink, an anthropologist who focuses on development studies, 
has pointed out,  
… the crucial issue is really if the recipient government is committed 
to a certain policy as if it is their own, not whether they have come up 
with on their own. In this perspective, the heart of the matter is there-
fore the commitment to the policy, while the issue of who makes the 
decisions fades into the background. (Borchgrevink 2012: 17)  
Two opposing views on development have emerged: (i) that develop-
ment is an activity where the international community increasingly 
seeks to equip developing countries with ‘ownership’ of their own coun-
try’s politics and policies, and (ii) that the only thing developing coun-
tries get ‘equipped with’ through development projects is ownership of 
an existing or given rationality of governing. It is symptomatic of this 
second view that the situational analyses conducted by international or-
ganizations like the World Bank and the UN assess all countries accord-
ing to the same criteria – which, however, presupposes the existence of 
an ideal policy, regardless of the specific context.  
This is also a challenge with most projects for building cyber security 
capacity. There are many different actors and approaches to CCB – here 
let me mention the Cyber Index of the UN Institute for Disarmament Re-
search, the Belfer Center at Harvard and its Cyber Readiness Index 1.0, 
the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s International Cyber Policy Cen-
ter Maturity Metric, the Asia Pacific CERT network’s Cyber Green, Mi-
crosoft’s Linking Cyber security Policy and Performance, and the Cyber 
Security Capability Maturity Model at the Global Cyber Security Capacity 
Centre at Oxford.12 However, all these approaches are embedded in nor-
mative approaches that apply and promote certain sets of values, ideas 
and standards, ranking them according to a universalistic teleological 
view on world history. As also Francis Fukuyama (2014) has noted, 
transferring modern institutions to developing countries or other socie-
ties can succeed only as if the transfer is anchored in these countries’ 
own context as regards existing rules and the political forces supporting 
these rules. This in turn means that the evaluations offered by various 
CCB needs assessments would benefit from being contextualized, rich 
and detailed in their descriptions, and incorporating knowledge based 
on empirical research. This work should be carried out as most tradi-
tional development projects have done, including infrastructure devel-
opment (first mile, middle mile, last mile and invisible mile (World Bank 
2016: 205)), with attention to rule-of-law aspects and the broader eco-
nomic and social factors.  
                                                          
12  For further details about the various approaches see Muller (2015). 
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The ownership debate has long traditions in the development litera-
ture, but very few have examined ownership and how it pertains to CCB. 
Because of the role assumed by the private sector in the digital revolu-
tion, the public–private relationship in this field should be viewed also 
in terms of ‘ownership’. 
Ownership and public–private cooperation  
Most of the world’s critical cyber assets are owned and managed by pri-
vate enterprises. This means that states are dependent on private com-
panies in order to provide public security. And yet, states seem to be very 
protective of their own power and authority involving cyber security. 
Where cyberspace used to be dominated and produced by private actors, 
states are now increasingly entering the field of cyberspace and enforc-
ing state authority. It is important to explore this tendency, paying at-
tention to the ownership debate in development and peacebuilding 
studies. As noted, cyber security involves a multitude of actors both in-
side and outside of governments, with differing representations and con-
cepts of security – political, social, economic, corporate and private. In 
this context, where ideas of security (whose and what) can become con-
tested and politicized, research is needed to underpin policy recommen-
dations and ideas of ownership:  
Cyber security research is steadily growing, but in international rela-
tions and security studies, it is not a mature field yet. Apart from a few 
exceptions, research remains fragmented, is biased towards just one 
expression (cyber war), and struggles to tap into existing funding re-
sources. Given this relative weakness, many important issues remain 
under-researched. The importance of ‘the private’ in the establish-
ment of the topic as national security issue is one of those issues 
(Cavelty, forthcoming 2016: 14).  
Cyber security differs from other security areas in one key way: tradition-
ally it has been private actors who have been entering into state security 
domains, but with cyber security it is the other way around. States are 
now trying to (re)establish, take ownership and gain terrain in cyber-
space, a space which has been cultivated by innovative companies and 
consumers – but also by criminal elements. For donor countries engaged 
with aid and development in developing countries this represents a chal-
lenge, because many of the structural assumptions about ownership, au-
thority and governance previously taken for granted must now be ques-
tioned.  
This will require mapping such structural challenges and identifying 
potentials for public/private cooperation in development engagements 
in developing countries. Topics that could be explored for potential do-
nor involvement concerning ownership include social responsibility and 
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cyber security, lawful intercept and authority requests, security and pri-
vacy, public awareness, ethical challenges, and possible constellations 
with governments, private actors and NGOs. 
 
Conclusions 
This report has shown how digitalization and cyber security as new 
global challenges are becoming increasingly central to the organization 
of development assistance – with consequences for billions of people in 
the developing world. With the emergence of digitalization and cyber se-
curity challenges, the transfer of knowledge and experience from tradi-
tional donor countries to the developing countries becomes crucial, per-
haps even more important, than the transfer of funding. In the long term, 
this development may contribute to more equal partnerships, in which 
the interests of donors as well as of recipient countries are safeguarded. 
This report has also shown how new development actors (public and pri-
vate) are becoming involved, making the group of donors more diverse 
and bringing in different policy traditions and ways of thinking. Drawing 
on the old adage ‘Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a 
man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime’, the title of this report points 
to the importance of sustainability through teaching and educating peo-
ple in developing countries about digital skills and opportunities. How-
ever, in the same way as teaching someone how to surf ocean waves is 
not enough in order to master those waves, teaching someone how to 
surf the Internet is not enough to bridge the digital divide. Surfers need 
surfboards, but they must also know how to swim, must understand the 
forces of the waves, and be familiar with the local context, currents, cor-
als and reefs below the surface. Merely teaching someone how to surf the 
Internet is not enough to foster sustainable development. Access to the 
Internet must be combined with analogue foundations, knowledge, 
awareness and a digital environment where the focus on security will be 
increasingly important.  
There are in cyber space many corals, reefs and currents that must be 
understood. The research reviewed here indicates that there are oppor-
tunities for donor countries in this field. Digitalization brings with it a 
pressing need for knowledge, education, institution building and expe-
rience-sharing among countries and regions. Although traditional devel-
opment mechanisms can be applied to enhance sustainable develop-
ment through building cyber security capacity, this combination also in-
troduces new aspects and dilemmas in the field of development. Private 
actors have dominated the trajectory of the digital revolution. The digital 
environment, or cyberspace, has been fostered and developed by com-
panies and consumers – and also by less honourable actors. This trajec-
tory has produced a set-up in which private actors have assumed the 
dominant role.  For development actors, this represents a challenge, be-
cause many of the structural assumptions about ownership, authority 
and governance that have underpinned traditional development policies 
are now turned upside-down.  
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As shown in this report, building cyber-security capacity in develop-
ing countries must be conducted on several levels, simultaneously, 
through a holistic approach. There are the technological, organizational 
and human dimensions, and the local, national and international levels. 
Norway has long traditions of successful international engagement in 
working on all these levels, and the importance of exchanging 
knowledge, lessons learnt and building trust between countries has of-
ten been emphasized. Building capacity in cyber security represents a 
relatively new political field, not properly included in the UN’s SDG 
(2015) or even in the World Bank’s World Development Report – Digital 
Dividends (2016), where donor countries like Norway can continue their 
long-term foreign policy traditions by incorporating a new policy field. 
Distinct properties of cyberspace – such as the fact that it has no borders, 
few rules and free flow of information – trigger new kinds of challenges 
with regard to international politics and diplomacy. Managing such 
challenges will require in-depth understanding of the democratic, social 
and economic development contexts on which cyberspace depends. 
  
Recommendations 
 Baseline studies show that there is a gap between development 
goals and intentions in donor policies, and the level of digital 
vulnerability and cyber security in developing countries. This in-
dicates that, if digital development is to be sustainable, it will 
need to be followed up by a focus on digital security. Here donor 
countries can assist, through core development and aid activi-
ties, with projects focused on improving the analogue founda-
tions for the digital technology such as knowledge, information, 
education, employment and institutions – but also by facilitating 
arenas where experience and lessons learnt can be shared at lo-
cal, national and regional levels.  
 Norway has a long track record of development assistance as 
well as with multilateral diplomacy.  Combining these two di-
mensions, through cyber security capacity building (CCB), could 
provide excellent opportunities for Norwegian foreign policy to 
strengthen Norwegian long-term interests like the production of 
new norms, as well as following up on the SDG commitments by 
contributing to the digital revolution in developing countries.  
 Because digitalization has been driven primarily by commercial 
interests, greater public–private cooperation is necessary in the 
development sector.  
 Developing countries should be trained in how to gear them-
selves to become part of the international CERT cooperation. Do-
nor countries like Norway could help to facilitate this through 
capacity building, collaborating with actors such as FIRST, and 
by improving knowledge and expertise in developing countries 
about CERTs. 
 FIRST has a limited number of Fellowships, and seeks to partner 
with organizations willing to contribute to the fellowship pro-
gramme. Here is an opening for ministries of foreign affairs, or 
other sponsors, to strategically sponsor such fellowships in de-
veloping countries on their focus lists.  
 While maintaining its focus and prioritized collaboration with in-
ternational organizations such as the UN, EU, NATO and AU, 
Norway should also seek ways of working together with major 
private enterprises, perhaps especially when engaging in devel-
opment and aid.  
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 Awareness-raising information campaigns and gatherings with 
constellations of authorities, local authorities, international or-
ganizations, national organizations, NGOs, private actors, senior 
networks and women networks may considerably improve the 
level of cyber security level within a country. The awareness di-
mension and the facilitation of various niche capabilities and in-
stitution-building are also areas where Norwegian expertise 
could be exported, to help in counteracting the hollow digitiza-
tion of developing countries. 
 To this end, Norway could for instance export the concept of Nas-
jonale sikkerhetsmåned (National security month) focusing on 
cyber security. Other potential niche capabilities for export 
through development activities include nettvett.no slettmeg.no 
and Security Divas – the latter in particular would readily fit with 
Norway’s traditions of enhancing and strengthening women’s 
rights and security in developing countries. 
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